This article discusses the 2017 elections in the context of a framework of analysis based on three levels of analysis: the institutional, the partisan and the situational. The framework used not only elucidates the extraordinary campaign and results, but places them in a diachronic perspective in order to assess the claim that the 2017 electoral series marked a partisan realignment. The 2017 campaign rewrote almost all of the rules associated with the presidential election. For the first time in the Fifth Republic, the incumbent president decided not to stand for re-election, signifying a state of institutional disarray. Moreover, neither of the candidates representing the traditional governing parties, the Republicans or the Socialists, won through to the second round, which saw centrist Emmanuel Macron o forta ly ele ted agai st the Natio al Fro t's Mari e Le Pe . Follo i g i the ake of Ma ro 's preside tial i tory, the 7 parlia e tary election conferred upon the Jupiterean President the overall parliamentary majority he had called for. If the presidency has escaped its worst-case s e ario, a d if Ma ro 's ele tio pro ides a i do of opportu ity to revive the presidency, the question of political and institutional trust is far from resolved.
To capture the full message of the 2017 contest, a broad temporal perspective is required, one that admits the specific nature of each presidential election, but which also allows structural regularities to emerge through comparison of electoral rules and trends. This article discusses the 2017 elections in the context of a framework of analysis based on three levels of analysis: the institutional, the partisan and the situational (Cole 2013) . The framework used not only elucidates the extraordinary campaign and results, but places them in a diachronic perspective in order to assess the claim that the 2017 electoral series marked a partisan realignment.
The institutional dimension
The French presidency might be considered in its own terms as an institution in two core senses of this term. In a traditional understanding, it is defined in precise ways by constitutional and political rules and legal norms. In line with new institutionalist thinking, it also represents a set of expectations about the personal and political roles that a French president ought to perform (March and Olsen, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Bedock, 2017) . The French presidency is sometimes presented as a timeless institution, a successful office that has restored stability (after the precarious disequilibrium of the Fourth Republic) and provided the model of an original hybrid, the semi-presidential regime, that has been subsequently been imitated in several other countries. Stability has been celebrated by incumbent French presidents, from General de Gaulle (who lauded the presidency as the alternative to a return of chaos) through to François Hollande (who evoked the stability of the institutions in his attempt to survive a period of unprecedented unpopularity from 2012 to 2014).
On the eve of Macron's election, however, commentators were openly questioning whether the French presidency was still fit for purpose. The core institutional traits of the office were shaped in a period far removed from the challenges facing France in 2017. The presidential office itself had evolved to such an extent that the public's perception of presidential action was rarely dissociated from the cleavages of domestic politics. After a long-period of presidential withdrawal under Jacques Chirac (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency (2007-12) was based on a transgression of the key personal and institutional codes, most notably on a deeply political reading of the office, whereby the political leader slated opponents and invited unpopularity in response to detailed interventionism in politics and policy-making. Though Hollande's (2012-17) personal presidential style was light years away from that of Sarkozy -ponderous, hesitant and deliberative -he faced similar constraints (the demand for rapid action to resolve crises; occupying the frontline in the economic crisis [unemployment, economic growth, competitiveness] ).
In the case of the past two presidents, the supra-partisan ideal of the French presidency gave way to a more sharply defined partisan appeal. The blame game (Sarkozy's rupture with the Chirac years, Hollande's persistent anti-Sarkozy stance) devalued the presidential institution. Sarkozy's claim to embody supra-partisan neutrality during the economic crisis from 2008 to 2010 was difficult to sustain given his hyper-presidentialist activism (Raymond, 2013) . Likewise, Hollande failed to rise above the Socialist party politics that had propelled him to office after his success in the 2011 PS primary election. This distance between the president and public opinion was to restore the prestige of the presidential office, to the point of theorising the office and his own practice in terms of the Jupiterean presidency, above parties, above the fray and in (rarefied) direct contact with the people. In the language of new institutionalism, Macron set out to restore a form of presidential appropriateness, based on rules, norms and expectations inherited from earlier practices, notably the early years of the Fifth Republic. In a more traditional vein, the new president also made explicit his intention to strengthen the presidency and restore its former ascendancy, surfing on a deep antiparty sentiment that is considered in the following section.
The Partisan and anti-Partisan Dimensions
One interest in looking at the 'not so small n' of France's presidential elections since the first one in 1965 is that of accompanying the evolution of the party system. The nine presidential elections before 2017 provide a laboratory for understanding broader, 6 longer term electoral trends, party configurations and structural incentives. Each presidential contest gives rise to new debates about the nature of the party system, with existing conceptualisations (generally deduced from observing previous elections) invariably challenged in some respect by the most recent electoral series. Hence, the victory of the Socialist candidate, François Mitterrand, in 1981 laid bare the temporal boundedness of the 'bipolar quadrille' that had been theorised at great length after the 1978 parliamentary election.
1 In turn, the frame of bipolar multipartism, that explained quite well the 1981 contest, was challenged by the contested tripartite division of political space from the mid-1980s onwards, as the rise of the FN produced the appearance of three partisan blocs (Knapp, 2004; Grunberg and Schweisguth, 2003; Andersen and Evans, 2003) . After the 2007 electoral series had appeared to break the FN and consolidate the mainstream UMP and PS, analyses were once again squarely focused on left-right bipolarisation (Grunberg and Haegel, 2007) . The 2012 contest appeared to reaffirm the centrality of bipolar electoral competition, with the two secondround candidates representing the Socialists and the UMP, the key governmental parties of the Fifth Republic.
In 2017, it made more sense to reason in terms of the anti-partisan dimension. The claim that 2017 was a realigning election, in radical break with other presidential contests, was supported in some respects by the first-round results, where both governmental parties were excluded from the second-round run-off. The real headline story of the 2017 election related to the collapse of the governmental parties and the ebbing of the left-right cleavage, as much as to the changing structure of the party system (which is unclear, but which falls short of the dominant party system predicted in the immediate aftermath of Macron's election) (Bugeau, 2017) . Three challenges to party became manifest during the 2017 campaign, each of which are illuminated by comparison with the other presidential elections of the Fifth Republic.
Left-right bipolarisation and the presidentialisation of the party system.
One unwritten rule confined to history in 2017 is that the presidential election encourages a left-right bipolarisation and a corresponding presidentialisation of the party system. This was always an excessively institutional argument; each presidential election has produced a rather different political configuration (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 around here]
From 1965 to 2012, the logic of institutional and political equilibria, on balance, favoured a pattern of left-right bipolar competition. The left-right scenario prevailed in 1965, 1974, 1981, 1988, 1995, 2007 and 2012 In both cases, the hollowing out of the central party organisation meant that the primaries were institutional mechanisms with unintended effects. In the case of Les Républicains, the logic of the primaries extended far beyond the selection of the party's candidate. At the height of the Fillon 'affair' in early March 2017, the Républicain candidate used the result of the LR primary to fend off challenges to his candidacy. As
Fillon pointed out, in a televised interview on France 2 (5 March 2017), no-one could prevent him from standing as candidate (all the more in that he had already deposited the 500 signatories necessary to stand), not even the investigating magistrates who had announced the opening of a legal inquiry and ordered the candidate to appear before them on 15 March. On the Socialist left, the primary created a gulf between the candidate and the mass of PS députés, deeply anxious about their -slim -prospects of re-election. The aftermath of the primary retained a bitter taste, as few close to Valls became involved in the Hamon campaign and the former prime minister committed the supreme act of treason by announcing his vote for Macron before the first round. In both cases, the primaries marginalised the party organisation.
In sum, the Républicain (2016) and Socialist (2017) primaries destabilised party organisations, upset existing hierarchies and moved the putative presidential candidates to campaign in terms of core electors (witness Fillon's harsh attack on the French welfare state or Hamon's support for a universal revenue) at the expense of the elusive median voter. Nor was it obvious that the primaries were mainly used to select the best presidential candidate. In the specific case of the Socialist primary, some 73 per cent declared their priority to be that of selecting a candidate faithful to the values of the left, as against only 24 per cent who considered their vote would help to select a future president (ELABE, 2017a) . But were the primaries principally to blame for the collapse of the governmental parties? Did they really undermine the foundations of presidential institutions, weaken political parties and produce candidates that were unrepresentative of the broader electorate? Perhaps the primaries were not principally at fault. As
Grunberg argues, the parties were deeply divided anyway -this is why the primaries took place in the first instance (Grunberg, 2017) . The real crisis lay in the dangerously diminished legitimacy of political parties and their internal divisions.
Campaigning against parties
Each presidential campaign takes place in a distinct historical period, where the script cannot be written too far in advance. Some campaigns are more favourable to specific agendas than others. In 2002, for example, the security turn of the election was supported by underlying survey work on public preferences, which demonstrated that crime and security issues were high up the voters' agenda. In 2007, security remained important, but the broader promise of far-reaching change went beyond a narrow focus on security. In 2012, by contrast, evidence on public attitudes strongly suggested that social and economic issues were at the centre of French voters' concerns (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Bélanger, 2012). The public policy mood was a sombre one, tainted by a fear of globalisation and economic insecurity (Stimson, Tiberj and Thiébault, 2013) . In 2017, public policy debates were overwhelmed by a crisis of trust in political parties and a desire to sweep away the established partisan order. In the summer of 2016, I
argued that the theme of the Republic in Danger would likely shape the forthcoming presidential election; the dispute over the Burkini appeared at the thin end of the identity wedge (Cole, 2017) . As the campaign began in earnest, however, concerns over national (Gaxie, 2012) . A third, blunter instrument can observe variation throughout the campaign in terms of the fortunes of the leading candidates. Of the various opinion poll instruments available, the most convincing was the CEVIPOF's 2017 Election survey, a rolling survey of over 20,000 individuals that reported virtually on a monthly basis 3 . Table 2 presents the evolution of candidate fortunes over the period of the twelve months preceding the first round.
[ Table 2 around here]
There is strong circumstantial evidence that the 2017 campaign made a difference. 2014; departmental elections 2015; regional elections, 2015). As Table 2 
Interpreting the results
The first round of the presidential election, which was by far the decisive round in the electoral series, might in part be interpreted as a realigning election (Martin, 2000) . A realigning election represents first a moment of rupture, a radical break with the old order; this is then followed by a realignment around new issues, in all probability The FN's position on quitting the Euro divided the FN itself and appeared to be called into question only days before the first round. Mélenchon struck a markedly anti-European tone, but refused to rule out remaining within the EU and the euro. Fillon and Hamon both struck a notably euro-critical note.
Only Macron explicitly endorsed further European integration.
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The extent of distrust is regularly revealed by the CEVIPOF's Baromètre de la confiance politique, a major survey into public attitudes towards politicians and parties.
less clear that 2017 marked an ideological paradigm shift, as opposed to eclectic, random and inconsistent responses to the pressing policy issues of the day. per cent in the second. The confirmation election is implicitly based on a lesser popular mandate (hence legitimacy) than the decisive presidential contest, though this distinction is nowhere formally recognised.
With the election of Macron, the old world of left-right partisan politics has appeared to be crumbling at the edges. The victory of the LRM/MODEM ticket was announced so far in advance that its actual majority was considered to be somewhat disappointing -and certainly well below the true 'blue chambers' of 1993 and 2002 9 .
The overall parliamentary victory was a remarkable achievement for a movement created barely one year earlier; it was crowned by the arrival in the National Assembly The second mechanic is the return of the presidential party, or the majority elected primarily to support an incumbent president. True, the presidential party is a contested concept (Cole, 1993) . And certainly, no presidential party was ever the same. De form: the party of the 'right and the centre' was largely ignored by the successive presidents (Chirac and Sarkozy) who saw its main function as being to organise the president's supporters in parliament. Macron's LRM can be seen as the latest version of the presidential party and it is likely to follow a tested lifestyle: electoral triumph, the growth of internal dissensions, diminishing political returns and ultimate political defeat. Whatever awaits, President Macron's coronation is now complete with the presidential majority that he has called for.
Interpreting 2017
After the Brexit outcome in the UK's referendum on the European Union in June 2016
and Donald Trump's election as US president in November 2016, many journalists and political commentators across the world assumed that the French presidency would be the next domino to fall. At a rather less cataclysmic level of analysis, 2017 appeared as make or break time for the French presidency, victim in turn of a deep crisis of trust in political institutions and politics in general, a crisis not specifically limited to France (Grossman and Sauger, 2017) . Though the eventual outcome firmly challenged these major and minor versions of impending disaster, the 2017 electoral series left a series of questions unanswered. Our analytical take is that these electoral moments of 2017 are best understood in the context of a framework of analysis that combines three levels: the institutional, the partisan and the situational. The framework used not only elucidates the extraordinary campaign and results, but places them in a diachronic perspective. Giscard d'Estaing discovered to his cost, the quest to represent two out of every three French citizens will fade away as the business of making difficult choices begins. More profoundly, has the anti-party rhetoric gone too far? Parties are intermediary institutions whose efficient functioning is necessary for democracy. LRM will need to become more of a party, albeit primarily a presidential one, not only to provide disciplined support for President Macron and the government of his prime minister, Édouard
Philippe, but also to mediate the inevitable tensions that power will bring. The experience of past presidential parties suggests that, if it is to survive for more than one presidential term, it will need to articulate a coherent political discourse that is not merely a form of subservience to Jupiter, the omnipotent president. Such will be the real measure of whether a partisan realignment has indeed taken place.
The 2017 electoral series also demonstrated that context matters. The dynamics of the 2017 electoral campaign were highly unpredictable, in part the result of events (for example, the recurrent affairs or Hollande's decision not to stand for re-election), in part a reflection of the changing contexts within which electoral campaigns are fought. The 
